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This study aims to contribute to a critical diagnosis of Hurri-
cane Katrina’s impact on two communities in the New Orleans
area: the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard through a system-
atic inquiry into the built environment and social inequality.
A socio-historical investigation of the Port of New Orleans
and its major 20th-century infrastructure projects, two ship ca-
nals called the Industrial Canal and Mississippi River-Gulf
Outlet which transformed the built environment of the Lower
Ninth Ward and St. Bernard, is presented. The historical analy-
sis focuses on the political power and ideological discourses
of the growth coalition that ruled the port through a non-
elected board known as the Dock Board. The author argues
that business elites affiliated with the board remade the built
environment in their own interest without consideration of the
local communities. The implications of this history for a criti-
cal understanding of Hurricane Katrina are explored.
Introduction
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina moved ashore onto
the Gulf Coast. The damage inflicted by the storm cost over 1,000
lives, completely destroyed over 350,000 homes and displaced
between 700,000 and 1.2 million people (Gabe et. al. 2005). While
the impact stretched across 88 counties, two parishes (the term
for county in Louisiana) suffered a disproportionate share of the
devastation: Orleans, which is coterminous with the city of New
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Orleans, and St. Bernard, its southeastern neighbor. In New
Orleans, 378,206 people out of the 487,779 total population experi-
enced severe flooding; 64,955 of 65,153 residents in St. Bernard
experienced severe flooding (Gabe et. al. 2005: 8). In total, 62.5%
of the storm’s most affected population resided in these two par-
ishes. Ten months after the storm, at the time of this writing,
Orleans and St. Bernard continue their struggle to rebuild their
communities.
The immediate reaction of social commentators to Katrina in
the popular media posed the question: “How can this happen in
America?” Official and unofficial inquiries began to explore this
issue. The Army Corps of Engineers first proposed that the
storm’s power overwhelmed the flood protection system, but an
investigation orchestrated by the American Association of Engi-
neers repudiated that argument (Brown 2005; Grunwald 2005).
The storm surge from the Gulf of Mexico did not exceed design
capacity; to the contrary, the levees failed.1 Additionally, the
severity of flooding varied across different neighborhoods within
the city. A veteran writer for the New Orleans Times Picayune
noted how the inundated areas of the city had, in most cases,
been developed after 1870 (Marshall 2006). Two of the hardest
hit communities within the New Orleans area, where practically
every housing unit was destroyed, included the Lower Ninth
Ward and St. Bernard. Scientific investigation by the Louisiana
State University Hurricane Center documented the floodwater’s
source in these devastated communities: A navigation canal
called the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet helped “funnel”
Katrina’s storm surge so as to overwhelm the levees along this
waterway and another called the Industrial Canal (Brown 2005).
Regarding the social dimensions of the disaster, major news
media, such as Newsweek and Time, raised the specter of race
and poverty as another factor in need of attention. The discus-
sion also considered the plight of the Ninth Ward since this com-
munity had some of the highest concentrations of African Ameri-
can poverty in the city. This brief review of the post-Katrina dis-
course highlights the built environment and social inequality as
key contributors to the storm’s damage.2
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A critical, more comprehensive understanding of the storm must
further explore these human contributions to the “natural” disaster.
This study aims to contribute to a critical diagnosis of Katrina’s
impact through a more systematic inquiry into the built environ-
ment, social inequality and their inter-relationships. In this effort, I
conduct a socio-historical investigation of the Port of New Or-
leans, two of its 20th-century economic development projects (In-
dustrial Canal and Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet) and the commu-
nities of the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard—which were
transformed by these waterways and subsequently destroyed by
Katrina.
This paper contains the following organization. To begin, I of-
fer an overview of the urban studies literature on New Orleans.
This review lays out the historical context of the city’s rampant
poverty and power structure. The existing scholarship consistently
references a local “aristocracy” who influenced the city’s affairs
vis-à-vis the control of non-elected commissions. After this re-
view, I explore the relationship between this class of business elites,
who I call the Big Easy Elites, and the built environment of New
Orleans. For this purpose, I introduce a conceptual framework
that draws on political economy and urban sociology. I conceptual-
ize the built environment as a product of capitalist structural dy-
namics and the agency of the local growth coalitions, whose ranks
include non-elected boards. In any urban setting these coalitions
act as architects of public policy and proselytizers of growth ideol-
ogy in order to reshape the landscape in their own interests. At this
point I begin the socio-historical study of the non-elected board
that governs the Port of New Orleans: the Board of Commission-
ers of the Port of New Orleans, locally known as the Dock Board.
An analysis of the Board’s creation and structure outlines how
local business associations established the Dock Board and formed
a more powerful growth coalition, which I label the Krewe de
Growth. The historical narrative addresses the construction of the
two navigation canals it produced, the Industrial Canal and the
Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MR-GO). These two waterways
transformed the built environment of St. Bernard and the New
Orleans Lower Ninth Ward to stimulate economic growth. The
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analysis interrogates the Krewe de Growth’s ideological discourses,
which legitimated these growth projects and enabled their comple-
tion. Then, it examines the difficulties encountered by Krewe de
Growth in its pursuit of subsequent projects due to citizen opposi-
tion. After residents defeated the new projects, they called for
officials to address the flood hazards of MR-GO. In response to
the mounting protest of local residents, Big Easy Elites deployed
the same ideological discourses which they previously exploited to
legitimate their power throughout the Dock Board’s history. Over-
all, I argue that the political power and ideological discourses of the
non-elected Dock Board permitted Big Easy Elites to remake the
built environment of St. Bernard and the Lower Ninth Ward in the
interests of the local aristocracy and at the expense of residents. I
conclude by revisiting the meaning of Katrina in light of these his-
torical patterns of development.
Social Context of New Orleans
Any attempt to explain “how Katrina could happen in America”
must address the relationship between social inequality and the
built environment. Toward these ends, I review a wide range of
scholarship that examines the political economy of New Orleans
(e.g. Hirsh 1992; Gotham 2005). This literature marks the point of
departure to address the dynamics of social inequality in the city.
As much of the scholarship pointed out, New Orleans had a
high of rate poverty prior to Katrina. In 2000, 27.9% of the New
Orleans population lived below the poverty line.3 This high concen-
tration of poor African Americans clearly exacerbated the flood’s
impact. Because many impoverished residents lacked access to
reliable transportation, tens of thousands remained in harm’s way
as wealthier residents fled in their cars.
However, the association of New Orleans with African Ameri-
can poverty is something relatively new to the city. For most of its
long history, a bustling port promoted economic prosperity. Founded
at the beginning of the 18th century, New Orleans stood as the
nation’s fifth largest city in 1850 and continued to overshadow other
southern cities until the middle of the 20th century (Mumphrey and
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Moomau 1984). Its economic decline occurred after WWII. By
the 1960s New Orleans become a Southern anomaly as it followed
the same course as the “rustbelt” cities of the North, rather than
the “sunbelt” South, with its sprawling metropolises like Houston
and Dallas (Mumphrey and Moomau 1984). Population decline
and racial and economic segregation redefined the social landscape
of New Orleans (Lewis 2003). City population dropped 20.8% in
three decades, falling from 627,525 in 1960 to 496,938 in 1990.4
The city also shifted from a white majority to a black majority
between 1970 and 1980 (Perry and Stoke 1987). In 2000, African
Americans represented 67% of the population. The demographic
characteristics of the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard further
illustrate the emergent pattern of residential segregation. In 2000,
the Lower Ninth Ward had a population of 19,515, which was about
91% black. St. Bernard, which lies adjacent to the Lower Ninth
Ward, had a population of 67,229 that was about 88% white. In
economic terms, St. Bernard—which was by no means affluent—
also compared favorably to the city with a lower poverty rate
(13.1%) and higher median income.5 So what accounts for the
economic downturn of New Orleans over the last half century?
The urban scholarship points to macro social processes includ-
ing deindustrialization and white flight/suburbanization. In the 1960s,
the modest manufacturing sector entered a steady decline (Gotham
2005; Smith and Keller 1984; Whelan et. al. 1994). By 2000, manu-
facturing accounted for a meager 5% percent of employment. Some
industries moved to surrounding areas like St. Bernard—where
manufacturing shipments surpassed New Orleans in value in 1997,
although the parish had less than 14% of the population of
Orleans.6 On the waterfront, which played a larger role in the city
economy, work became more capital-intensive. New shipping meth-
ods (e.g. containerization) reduced the demand for unionized, high-
wage workers on the docks (Smith and Keller 1984; Young and
Whelan 1993). While tourism mushroomed during this period of
deindustrialization (with the number of hotel rooms growing over
700% from 1960 to 2000), service industry jobs offered less oppor-
tunity to area residents (see Gotham 2005).
White flight accompanied school desegregation in the 1960s
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when white residents moved to surrounding suburbs (Bankston
and Caldron 2002). This demographic shift dramatically affected
the Lower Ninth Ward as a large population of working class whites
moved east to St. Bernard.7 For the working class suburb, white
flight engendered a population explosion of 360% between 1950
and 1970.8 But for the city of New Orleans, emigration combined
with deindustrialization to reduce the size of the middle class and
promote more extreme class polarization. For the city’s African
American population, poverty and unemployment intensified. In
the 1970s, the city had the highest family poverty rate in the coun-
try (Glassman 1978). In 1990, over half of the black children in the
city lived below the poverty line (Bankston and Caldron 2002).
With a declining tax base and antiquated tax code, fiscal troubles
handicapped the ability of city government to address the growing
challenge of poverty (Smith and Keller, 1984; Whelan et. al. 1994).
Aside from deindustrialization and suburbanization, a number
of studies consider the effects of the city’s power structure on its
economic hardships. Numerous researchers agree that an “estab-
lished social aristocracy” enjoyed a position of unrivaled privilege
in New Orleans (Whelan et. al. 1994: 10). The power of this class
crystallized in the final decades of the 19th century (Hirsh 1992;
see also Teaford 1984). In response to the rising political influence
of ethnic immigrant communities, these Big Easy Elites established
a number of non-elected (“depoliticized”) boards to govern the city
budget, drainage and parks in addition to its port (Hirsh 1992). This
maneuver assured that “members of the oligarchy” retained sub-
stantive control of city governance (Whelan et. al. 1992: 6). Urban
historian Arnold Hirsh offers a cogent assessment of this govern-
ment restructuring: “Protected from the vagaries of electoral poli-
tics, these boards constituted an insular, unelected governing oli-
garchy drawn from a narrow social and business elite well cogni-
zant of its own interest” (1992: 469). An investigation of the inter-
relations between social inequality and the built environment must
scrutinize this “rigid social structure dominated by a small number
of wealthy white families who have been in the city for genera-
tions” (Perry and Stokes 1987: 226).9 These non-elected boards
controlled by elites made the major land use decisions and de-
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signed the city’s infrastructure before deindustrialization and
suburbanization altered the social landscape.
How does this literature inform a critical examination of Katrina?
First, it uncovers the urban processes that gave rise to the social
landscape, including the city’s high concentration of poor African
Americans. In a sense, many better-off residents evacuated over
the last forty years, and the abandoned city struggled to remake
itself in a postindustrial economy. However, the relationship be-
tween social inequality and the (flood-prone) built environment is
complex: race and poverty cannot explain the origins of the city’s
infrastructure examined in this study. The two communities con-
sidered here, the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard, differed re-
garding socio-economic variables prior to the storm; but, as the
two most decimated areas in the New Orleans area following
Katrina, they shared a common fate with respect to flooding. Their
common outcome stems from their shared infrastructure—that is,
the navigation canals dug before the city’s economic downturn
that redrew the social landscape. Therefore, a critical diagnosis of
the recent flood must explore dimensions of inequality in addition
to race and poverty. It should investigate the “social aristocracy”
who wielded the power to create the hazardous built environment
through its control of non-elected boards. But first I consult politi-
cal economy and urban sociology to further conceptualize the rela-
tionship between business elites and the production of urban space.
Conceptual Framework
Urban social theory and sociology provide tools to uncover the
social processes through which business elites fashion the built
environment in their own interest. But even elites do not act under
conditions of their own choosing. Critical urban theorists reveal
how the structural dynamics of capital accumulation affect urban
phenomena (Harvey 1981, 1996; Lefebvre 1981, 1991; for a over-
view and sympathetic critique, see Gottdiener 1985).10 According
to David Harvey, capitalism molds the built environment “in its
own image”, that is, into a form “appropriate to the purpose of
production and reproduction” of a class society—where the
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majority work for the benefit of the few (1981: 265). Since capital-
ist production must continuously grow, pressure builds for more
intensive land uses (Smith 1990). The social inequities endemic to
capitalist social structure foster social instability (i.e., “crisis ten-
dencies”), which appears in the built environment (Feagin 1988;
Gottinedener 1985; Harvey 1981, 1996). For example, capitalist
competition, class struggle and economic cycles redirect invest-
ment flows across different cities (e.g., from the “Rustbelt” to the
“Sunbelt”) and within different areas of a city (e.g., from core to
suburb).
Individual capitalists transform the built environment accord-
ing to their needs with direct private investment or through the
mediation of the state (Harvey 1981). The state assures that ad-
equate infrastructure exists for capitalist production; the overriding
goal of this public investment is to facilitate capital accumulation
by private individuals (Harvey 1981; O’Connor 1971).11 Critical
urban sociologists document the disproportionate influence of busi-
ness elites on public policy and observe the unevenly distributed
costs and benefits of public investment (Domhoff 1998; Feagin
1998; Gotham 2000; Logan and Molotch 1987). This area of re-
search enriches the structural analysis of capitalism by incorporat-
ing the “particular actors whose concrete actions actually shape
urban development at the everyday level” (Feagin 1988: 23). Busi-
ness elites influence public investment by organizing into growth
coalitions: alliances of interlocking private and public actors who
act in concert to promote urban development (Logan and Molotch
1987).
One powerful instrument utilized by elite growth coalitions to
manage the public sector is the non-elected board or commission
(Judd and Swanstrom 1994).12 The historical work of Teaford
chronicles how social elites across the country, who were involved
with the local Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade or civic
organizations, lobbied state legislatures and drafted legislation to
establish these “autonomous plutocratic commissions” over the last
three decades of the 19th century (1984: 75). Insulated from demo-
cratic oversight, “these independent commissions often became
bastions of the city’s elite…perched proudly at the top of the urban
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social ladder” (68, 76). The intimate relationship between public
and private sector that continues to this day frequently excludes
average citizens from meaningful participation in the decision-mak-
ing process that shapes the built environment (Squires 1989).
To maintain their privileged position in directing the allocation
of public resources, business elites deploy a variety of ideological
discourses. As Gregory Squires explains, the “power of private
capitals has been advanced by several myths pertaining to the role
of the public and private actors” (1989: 4-5). Urban scholars use
the term privatism to encompass the cultural presuppositions that
sanctify the market and private sphere while deriding the unsavory
“politics” of the public realm (Barnekov et. al. 1993; Levine 1989;
Warner 1968). This ideology protects business from meaningful
public oversight. It also validates anti-democratic institutions, such
as non-elected boards, that privilege elite interests by subordinat-
ing public authority to economic criteria (e.g., efficiency) and
heroicizing the “character” of business leaders (Judd and
Swanstrom 1994). The ideology of growth legitimates the state
subsidization of private capital accumulation, or “economic devel-
opment”, above other social goals (Smith and Judd 1981). In the
public sphere, growth coalitions frame the individual pursuit of wealth
as a socially benevolent endeavor that fosters general community
progress—e.g., expansion of the tax base or job creation (Logan
and Molotch 1987). These ideological representations obscure the
uneven distribution of the growth benefits and hide its social costs.
As Smith and Judd state, pro-growth policies “often directly trans-
fer resources from middle income and working people to the “haves”
on little more than blind faith that growth is in the public interest”
(1981: 191). I view privatism and growth discourses as comple-
mentary ideologies advanced by growth coalitions. When effec-
tive, both discourses mediate the material transformation of the
built environment by manufacturing a social consensus for new
development.
Returning to the case of New Orleans, these concepts help
map the social processes that formed its hazardous built environ-
ment and set the stage for Katrina. At the structural level, inter-
port competition, new shipping technologies and cycles of world
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trade are a few of the capitalist dynamics that shaped the produc-
tion of urban space. At the level of local practice, Big Easy Elites
used private business associations and the non-elected Dock Board
as a growth coalition. Through this Krewe de Growth they man-
aged public policy to construct infrastructure projects in the Ninth
Ward and St. Bernard. The ideology of privatism excused the so-
cial inequality inherent in this arrangement. The ideology of growth
justified the public subsidization of private accumulation. Two dis-
tinct discourses appeared in the formation of its pro-growth poli-
cies: a discourse of modernization and the discourse of entre-
preneurial structuralism. The former asserted the need to subju-
gate the urban landscape, especially the Mississippi River, to serve
commerce. The latter argued that competitive pressures and eco-
nomic imperatives dictated what changes were in order. I will now
move to the historical portion of this paper beginning with the origin
and structure of the non-elected board that governed the port, shaped
the landscape of the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard, and
changed the lives of their residents.
Creation of the Dock Board
From the time of the city’s founding, the port dominated the
New Orleans economy, more so than any other major port city in
the country (Lewis 2003). All business was historically linked to
the port in some way (Schill 1974), and these businesses consis-
tently composed one of Louisiana’s most powerful economic inter-
est (Stiegman 1971).13 The environmental historian Ari Kelman
chronicles their power to determine the city’s built environment.
He documents how commercial elites “remade their urban riparian
ecosystem …to make the unpredictable predictable in the service
of capitalist development” over the course of three centuries (2003:
14-15). A history of New Orleans’ built environment starts with
the port and the formation of the Dock Board at the end of the 19th
century.
The people who own or work for port businesses organized into
various groups. Labor unions attained a strong presence on the docks
by the turn of 20th century, representing both white and black work-
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ers (Rosenburg 1988). Likewise, owners formed trade and business
associations, such as the New Orleans Board of Trade, the New
Orleans Steamship Association, and the Chamber of Commerce to
the New Orleans Area. The Big Easy Elites, who controlled these
associations, had direct financial incentives to intensify land use
along the waterfront and encourage economic activity on city wa-
terways. Collectively these private associations constitute a growth
coalition (Logan and Moltch 1987). While all Big Easy Elites did not
have a direct stake in the port, their notoriously tight-knit commu-
nity—which affiliated in exclusive social clubs and Mardi Gras
“krewes” and lived together in the Uptown area (Chai 1979)—
suggests a cohesive class with a unified interest (Domhoff 1998).
Near the end of the 19th century, chaotic conditions plagued
the waterfront (Kelman 2003; Martinez 1954). Competition be-
tween port entrepreneurs led to overproduction of wharves, berths
and other facilities. The glut of capital hampered profits and, thus,
discouraged basic maintenance of the built environment. The
dilapidated working conditions stimulated more intense labor con-
flicts culminating in a number of strikes—where longshoremen even
united across racial lines to the horror of the all white Big Easy
Elites (Rosenburg 1988). Therefore, unregulated socio-spatial con-
ditions posed a threat not only to the business order, but the larger
social system of power relations.
In 1895, the New Orleans Board of Trade, considered the most
powerful business association in the city from 1879 to 1928, orga-
nized a conference to “investigate” the conditions of the port
(Martinez 1955; Schill 1974). The growth coalition inquiry drew up
a text that became state law the following year. Louisiana Act No.
70 of 1896 created a new institution, a port authority, officially
named the Board of Commissioners for the Port of New Orleans,
which came to be known as the Dock Board. The speedy adoption
by the Louisiana Legislature indicates the political favor enjoyed
by the port growth coalition. The Louisiana government did not
hesitate to hand state powers to Big Easy Elites.
The formation of the Dock Board consolidated the interest of
the port growth coalition in a non-elected board. By law, this public
authority functioned to reproduce the conditions of capital accu-
Social Thought & Research
80
mulation in a jurisdiction sprawled across the three parishes of
Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard. Act No. 70 mandated its cen-
tral purpose to intensify land use: to “improve the wharves and
other facilities of the Port and greatly develop and expand com-
merce by removing many of the obstacles now placed in the way
of advancement.” This developmental function became an instru-
ment to channel public funds into capital improvement projects,
socializing the cost of production while privatizing the benefits (see
O’Connor 1971). In Act No. 70 the State Legislature also handed
the Dock Board powers that included “all things necessary or proper
for the government, regulation, development and control of the
business of such ports.” This regulatory function attenuated the
profit-eating contradiction of capitalist competition on the water-
front, allowing for the centralized planning of the port’s built envi-
ronment. Thus, the formation of the Dock Board represents an
initiative by elites to remedy the contradictory nature of capitalist
production and circulation by harnessing pubic power and resources.
Through direct control, the port growth coalition and the New
Orleans social aristocracy wielded the power of the Port Author-
ity. The administrative structure and the appointment process of
the Dock Board guaranteed the hegemony of Big Easy Elites. Act
70 specified that all commissioners must be “predominantly identi-
fied with the commerce or business interest of the Port of New
Orleans.” Later in 1940, a Louisiana constitutional amendment re-
vised the appointment process to free it from “politics” and for-
mally tie the growth coalition to its administration. Five business
and trade associations were selected to be nominating organiza-
tions. These included the New Orleans Association of Commerce,
the New Orleans Trade Association, the New Orleans Clearing
House, the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and the New Orleans
Steamship Association.14 The original and subsequent legislation
established a Board structure which guaranteed the direct control
by Big Easy Elites vis-à-vis the nominating organizations.15 The
Port growth coalition provided both the “selecting apparatus and
the single largest group of potential appointees” (Schill 1976: 116).
Together, the Dock Board and private associations comprised the
Port Krewe de Growth.
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The justification for this plutocratic arrangement evoked the
ideology of privatism. Richard B. Montgomery, Jr., the lawyer who
drafted the legislation, explained its logic:
We felt that the Dock Board could only get back into proper
operation by . . . having a Board completely out of polities run
by businessmen, steamship men, bankers, and people like that.
(quoted in Schill, 1074: 15).
Louisiana Governor Jones justified the amendment by claiming it
ennobled “men of character, men of irreproachable reputation, men
of vision” to “unselfishly strive to build our port of New Orleans to
its rightful place among the great ports of the world” (quoted in
Brenton 1953: 24). Montgomery and Jones imply that the business
of government is business, which should be handled by business-
men. Therefore, port affairs needed to be freed from the “politics”
of the city council and other democratically accountable institutions.
In this growth coalition, the lines between public and private
frequently blurred, but the distribution of cost and benefits crystal-
lized. The early history of the Board illustrates the cozy relation-
ship between the private and public sector, and reveals an elite
community very interested in the viability of this institution. In the
years following its creation, a dearth of public funding threatened
the Dock Board’s survival. To keep it afloat, local banks (e.g.,
Hibernia National Bank) issued emergency loans backed by mere
personal guarantees from the commissioners (Martinez 1955). Other
companies, such as Leyland Steamship, Harrison Steamship, United
Fruit and Southern Pacific, financed the construction of new facili-
ties on behalf of the Port by floating interest-free loans in exchange
for “first call on berth privilege” (Martinez 1955; Rosenburg 1988;
Stiegman 1971). Port commissioners later credited these initiatives
from the business community for the Dock Board’s survival. These
informal arrangements evidence a social consensus within the
social aristocracy regarding the management of the city’s largest
economic engine. They also suggest who likely benefited from its
management.
The Port Authority enjoyed fiscal powers, regulatory powers,
and developmental authority to create a built environment friendly
Social Thought & Research
82
to commerce. Administrative control of public waterfront property
and facilities made this institution the premier property manager of
the port. Its dependence on rents and land values wedded the
financial health of the public authority to the growth of river com-
merce and the exchange value of its property. And like any other
entrepreneur—and, at times, with the state power of eminent
domain—the Dock Board enjoyed the legal right to accumulate
more property if “necessary or proper for the government, regula-
tion, development and control of the business” (Louisiana Legisla-
ture Act No. 70 1896). In addition, state subsidization of the Dock
Board through taxes and bonds provided public resources for capi-
tal improvements to increase the value of its property. Through its
political power and access to public resources, the Dock Board
could redesign the socio-spatial conditions of the city on a far grander
scale than individual businessmen. Nonetheless, these larger projects
could still serve the interests of these business elites—and without
risking their personal fortunes.
Producing the Built Environment Part I:
The Industrial Canal
The first major project arranged by the Port Krewe de Growth
was the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, known as the Industrial
Canal, which was completed in 1921. Without assistance from the
federal government, the Dock Board coordinated the production
of a 5 ½ mile long, 30 foot-deep channel. The canal is located
downriver from the French Quarter; it runs north from the Missis-
sippi to Lake Pontchartrain, cutting through the New Orleans Ninth
Ward. The radical alteration to the built environment, as well as
what used to be swamplands, promised “unlimited industrial devel-
opment” (Board of Commissioners 1926: 31). With this project the
Krewe de Growth aimed to acquire new waterfront property in
order to draw more cargo and attract new industry.
An emergent discourse of Port modernization packaged the
growth ambitions of the Big Easy Elites. The modernization dis-
course rebuked the New Orleanian “mystic reverence” for the
Mighty Mississippi and the complicit satisfaction for its “natural
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advantages” (Bolding 1969). The words of a Louisiana governor
reflected this disenchantment with the extant environment: “while
there are these great natural outlets, commerce seeks the channel
of least resistance…and if New Orleans wishes to enjoy its great
advantages, man must come to its assistance” (quoted in Kelman
2003: 148). Traditional meanings of the river withered with the
demiurge of an instrumental rationality that promised a new
avenue to economic growth. In material terms, modernization trans-
lated into more space for industrial development and a rationalized
nature not possible on the riverfront. Specifically, proponents
argued that locks would allow Lake Pontchartrain to set the canal’s
water level, rather than the unruly and fluctuating Mississippi. More
control offered a better environment for industries like ship build-
ing. The waterway’s local name denotes this industrial ambition
and indicates how the resulting landscape objectified this discourse
of modernization.
The magnitude of this socio-ecological reworking necessitated
the concentrated economic and political power offered by the
maturing Krewe de Growth. With the support of the trade associa-
tions, the Dock Board raised the capital, obtained right-of-ways,
coordinated the labor, and solicited technocratic expertise from the
world-renowned engineer responsible for another major waterway:
the Panama Canal. Local geographer, Richard Campanella sum-
marizes the scale of this socio-ecological re-engineering: “With
labor gangs, mechanized excavators, pile drivers, dredges, dyna-
mite, and other implements, the largest construction project in New
Orleans history was rapidly redefining the geography of the Cres-
cent City” (1998: 74). The waterlogged soils of the swamps
between the lake and the city challenged work crews; existing
infrastructure, including railroads and the sewer system, compelled
the reorganization of the built environment. It was no small accom-
plishment by the Krewe de Growth.
In addition to producing an optimal landscape for business, the
Industrial Canal restructured social relations. First, new property
relations with respect to the land along the canal gave the Dock
Board more management authority than it held with the riverfront.
The Board was able to liberalize its leasing policy and offer gener-
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ous long-term leases for up to 99 years (Martinez 1955).16 Conse-
quently, the Industrial canal did not just lubricate commerce by
subduing nature’s unpredictability and making room for new indus-
try; it bolstered the power of the business class by extending its
control of the new public resource. The augmented status of busi-
ness elites also appeared in the modernization discourse after the
projects completion. A privatist theme celebrated the creative in-
genuity of the entrepreneurial spirit to improve an “outmoded”
Mississippi River. The words of one business commentator illus-
trate this point:
[The] people of New Orleans have begun to realize that the
natural advantages alone are not enough, but must be supple-
mented by thought and enterprise . . . Natural advantages plus
intelligent human enterprise will for all time safeguard New
Orleans’ larger interests.” (New Orleans Official Daily Court
Record, September 9 1943)
When Big Easy Elites touted this accomplishment, they affirmed
their privileged position to equate their own interest with “New
Orleans larger interest.”
While the Industrial Canal was certainly good for the Big Easy
Elites, for citizens residing in its proximity it brought disturbances
long before Katrina. In the Ninth Ward, the Dock Board displaced
a number of local residents, and bisected the community. The new
waterway erected a physical boundary, introduced new hazards,
and isolated a portion of the Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish
from the rest of the city. Symbolic boundaries accommodated the
material form of the new landscape as the fragmented neighbor-
hood became known as the “Lower Ninth Ward.”
Producing the Built Environment Part II: The MR-GO
The Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MR-GO) is a “tidewater”
channel that connects the Industrial Canal to the Gulf of Mexico.
This 76 mile canal extends from the Lower Ninth Ward, passes
through eastern New Orleans, traverses the marshes of St. Ber-
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nard Parish and cuts 40 miles off the trip from the Inner Harbor to
the Gulf than the alternative path of the meandering Mississippi.
Opened in 1963, this project was formally completed in 1967. With
an original width of 500 feet and a depth of 36 feet, the MR-GO
was large enough to accommodate most ocean-going vessels in its
early days of operation.17
The idea to build a “better river” connecting the Port to the
Gulf dates back to the early 19th century. Proposals for a direct
route occurred as early as 1826 when the Louisiana Legislature
introduced a resolution for the “Tidewater Channel” (Times Pica-
yune 1957 December 11: 1). But early initiatives never gained
traction until the opening of the Industrial Canal—which provided
“a starting point of a long-discussed short-cut tidewater level
channel to the sea” (Times Picayune 1963, September 9). For
example, one business elite with the Association of Commerce
brought both the ideal and real canals together: “completion of the
Inner Harbor and Industrial Canal now make possible the dredging
of a ship channel of 40 or 45 feet depth direct to the gulf” (New
Orleans States Item 1923 November 20:15). However, this initial
optimism for the channel waned with the onset of the Great De-
pression. The earnest mobilization of a growth coalition in support
of the “tidewater channel” began in 1943 (Bolding 1969). Comple-
tion of the MR-GO required three conditions: 1) favorable eco-
nomic circumstances, 2) an active and powerful growth coalition,
and 3) the crystallization of a new growth ideology. I explore these
overlapping contributions which made possible the production of
the infrastructure that later channeled the storm surge of Hurri-
cane Katrina.
Wartime Shipping Bonanza
The port prospered during WWII. From 1937 to 1947, New
Orleans experienced 41% growth in foreign trade (Board of Com-
missioners 1947 April). While the entire nation witnessed a new
prosperity, Big Easy Elites especially thrived as they courted higher
volumes of traffic than competing ports. Fortune Magazine at-
tributed this success to the ability of “boosters” and the “city’s top
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citizens” to cultivate a “good sales-engineering job.” These place-
entrepreneurs marketed “every conceivable service from free sec-
retarial assistance to oysters Rockefeller at Antoine’s” (1948: 102).
In addition to its “overpowering display of charm”, the growth coa-
lition erected new office space and port facilities to encourage
growth, which included the International Trade House, the Pan-
American Building, and the nation’s second Free Trade Zone. A
new seaway complemented a “pattern” or “blueprint” to sustain
the “shipping bonanza” after the war (102).
Ports live and die by the ability to attract more cargo (Weigend
1958). After the war, labor conflict, industrial innovations, and com-
petitive pressures threatened the security of Port profits and growth.
The precariousness of their success stimulated the anxiety of Big
Easy Elites. The Dock Board explained their insecurity through
the rhetoric of the privatist ideology:
Port Development is a cold-fact business . . . No simple panacea
or formula . . . is going to overcome the constant and intense
competition between the many gateways and between the many
forms of transportation serving them. (Board of Commissioners
1940: 10)
Intensified inter-port competition challenged the status of New
Orleans as the nation’s second largest port when federally financed
infrastructure improvements on the Great Lakes and the Texas
coast enlarged the ports of Chicago and Houston (Kenyan 1973;
Juhn 1967). Additionally, unions were active on the docks (Army
Corps of Engineers and and United States Maritime Commission
1947). To the business community, frequent strikes and labor gains,
such as the forty hour work week, challenged elite authority and
limited the cargo capacity of river facilities (Board of Commission-
ers 1947). Furthermore, new productive forces in shipping (i.e.
larger vessels) reduced the berthing capacity of the city’s wharves.
Unruly workers, larger ships, and bigger competitors threatened
the postwar bonanza, leading Big Easy Elites to question the ad-
equacy of waterfront facilities. In this context an ad hoc coalition
emerged in order to sustain the city’s economic virility with a “sea-
way” extension from the port to the Gulf.18
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The Rising Tide of a Growth Coalition
Big Easy Elites formed an organization called the Tidewater
Development Association (TDA) to promote the seaway. This ad
hoc growth coalition worked closely with the Dock Board to con-
vince the Army Corps of Engineers to embrace the project. The
TDA leadership reflected the elite hegemony in the historic event
that transformed social and ecological landscapes of the Ninth Ward
and St. Bernard. Its two most influential members were Col. Lester
F. Alexander and A.B. Freeman, both of whom chaired the growth
coalition. Before founding the association, Col. Alexander served
as a commissioner for the Dock Board. He had previously worked
as an engineer for the Corps on the lower Mississippi River. After
his tenure with the federal government, Col. Alexander started his
own contracting firm and a shipbuilding company on the Industrial
Canal (Board of Commissioners 1950 February: 16, Juhn 1967).
His role demonstrates not only the institutional linkage between the
private sector, the Port of New Orleans, and the federal govern-
ment; his investment on the Industrial Canal gave Alexander a
direct financial interest in a project that would increase the value
of his property. A.B. Freeman represented the highest echelons of
the New Orleans social aristocracy. As a mark of his prestige,
Alfred Bird Freeman appeared in Who’s Who in America. He
worked as a Coca-Cola executive and founded Wesson Oil. He
also served as a port commissioner, held membership in the most
exclusive social club in the city (Boston Club), and served on the
Tulane Board of Trustees (Board of Commissioners 1948 January:
11). The TDA proved an enormously important addition to the
Krewe de Growth.
In the summer of 1943, a pair of events kicked off the cam-
paign for the Tidewater Channel. At the behest of Alexander, local
civic groups sponsored a public spectacle entitled “Greater Port
Day” in order to celebrate the port’s accomplishments and pro-
mote the seaway (New Orleans Item 1943 July, 27). Shortly there-
after, the TDA arranged a public meeting at the Roosevelt Hotel
located in downtown New Orleans. A general from the Army Corps
of Engineers coordinated the meeting, and the attendance of over
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500 businessmen impressed the Army. Over 50 briefs were sub-
mitted to the Corps in support of a channel from the Industrial
Canal to the Gulf of Mexico, which included formal endorsements
from the Dock Board, its nominating organizations, and labor unions
(Board of Commissioners 1943 August).
However, a local coalition from the West Bank of the River
stepped forward to jockey with the Dock Board and TDA for the
favor of the Army Corps. A contingent of Jefferson Parish politi-
cians and business interests, calling themselves the Mississippi River
Valley Seaway Canal Association, sponsored an alternative site
from the West Bank. Competition between plans for an “eastbank
seaway” and “westbank seaway” ensued for five years (Times
Picayune 1963, September 30: 1). But the Krewe de Growth ex-
pended superior resources to build consensus for the Industrial
Canal site. The Dock Board and TDA financed a series of “inves-
tigations” by engineering firms and a former Army colonel. The
resulting reports supported their position: the Industrial Canal of-
fered the only practical place for port expansion, and the Army
Corps of Engineers agreed (ACE 1951).19 The Corps also noted
the legal authority of the Board of Commissioners to oversee the
well-being of port affairs, and complimented the Dock Board’s
earlier achievements (e.g. the Industrial Canal). Therefore, fol-
lowing the second public meeting in New Orleans in March 1947,
the district engineer endorsed the “eastbank seaway” (Times Pica-
yune 1963 September 30: 1). Thus, in the early years of the cam-
paign, the Krewe De Growth won the site competition based on its
privileged legal authority and its superior ideological resources. After
this victory, the Dock Board and TDA took the case to Washing-
ton.
Following district approval, the canal plan trickled through the
Army Corps of Engineer’s bureaucracy (ACE 1951; for outline of
the decision-making process during this period, see Eckstein 1961:
2-8). After renaming the Tidewater Channel the Mississippi River-
Gulf Outlet, the Corps sent the plan to Congress. In the halls and
backrooms of the U.S. Government, MR-GO proponents competed
for authorization with the profoundly more costly St. Lawrence
Seaway Project from the Great Lakes, which had the backing of
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key Midwestern business allies and, consequently, more support
from Congress. At this point, the onset of the Korean War inspired
President Eisenhower to suspend all new ACE projects (Eckstein
1961).
Against these unfavorable circumstances, the Krewe de Growth
sustained its drive. TDA members testified before Congressional
hearings on behalf of the channel. After becoming president of the
association in 1954, A.B. Freeman instigated the courtship rituals
noted in Fortune Magazine to woo the Midwestern businesses
and congressional representatives. In 1955, a series of “inspection
tours” aboard a Dock Board yacht and some fine dining at Antoine’s
helped “spotlight the truth of the project,” as Senator Al Gore Sr.
put it (Times Picayune, 1955 December 7: 3). Big Easy methods
of authenticating truth in the finest restaurants of the French Quar-
ter helped secure the pledge of Congress. Authorization arrived in
the 1956 River and Harbors Act.
Tidewater Ideology
The power of the Krewe de Growth was manifested in its
ability to organize and control the discursive practices dealing with
the canal, and its ability to symbolically construct an “absolutely
essential” built environment for both the city and nation. Through
public meetings, private meetings, inter-organizational correspon-
dences, reports, presentations, governmental investigations, legis-
lation, dinner parties and boat rides, a coherent pro-growth dis-
course developed in support of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet.
In all the talk and text around the Tidewater Channel, two themes
appear central to the materialization of the project. First, the growth
discourse defined port economic development as an absolute so-
cial necessity for both the national economy and national security.
Second, the growth discourse produced a symbolic landscape that
promised material aplenty. This ideological production proved es-
sential in obtaining the government seal of legitimacy: “economic
feasibility.”
In what I call the discourse of entrepreneurial structural-
ism, economic elites consistently reiterated a rhetoric of need that
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declared the MR-GO “absolutely essential” to the welfare of the
port, city, state, and nation.20 This discursive construction of
necessity employed a redundant vocabulary of obligation, highlighting
the military and commercial value of the tidewater “emergency
outlet” to “national defense and general commerce” (Times Pica-
yune 1943 August 6: 1; Louisiana Legislature Concurrent Resolu-
tion 18; ACE 1951). Military and economic demands supposedly
made the seaway an “urgently needed and extremely important
artery to the sea” (Times Picayune 1957 December 11: 3).
The discourse of entrepreneurial structuralism represented the
Mississippi River and its surrounding built environment as unable
to sustain urgently needed growth. In an editorial, the Times Pica-
yune situated the project in the historical moment: “The United
States must trade over the world in a big way or its industrial ma-
chine will stagnate,” and to increase trade, “the country needs ports
of a large capacity” (Times Picayune 1957, December 10: 15).
Advocates asserted that the seaway would not only meet the de-
mands of a more competitive “new economic world” (Board of
Commissioners 1943: 8) but would “bring about economies that
will stimulate world trade” (Times Picayune 1943, August 5: 1-2).
By doing so, the port boosters claimed that no “project…would
contribute more to hemispheric solidarity” (Board of Commission-
ers 1943: 8). The emphasis on trade at the national level helped
construe New Orleans’ economic development as a national con-
cern. The rhetoric of need equates the well-being of a larger public
with local capital accumulation. As Louisiana Legislature concluded:
“prosperity for the citizens of New Orleans and the State of Loui-
siana” rested upon “the growth and expansion of the Port’s busi-
ness” (Louisiana Legislature 1944).
In the discourse of entrepreneurial structuralism, the built en-
vironment itself demanded new infrastructure. Tidewater propo-
nents declared existing infrastructure to be unacceptable due to
the changing nature of shipping. Larger vessels accentuated the
“definite need for a deep, safe, and dependable access channel to
the sea” (Louisiana Legislature 1944). Specifically, the Industrial
Canal lock was represented as a “bottleneck” or “immovable body”
impeding the “irresistible force of growing volumes of commerce”
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(Times Picayune 1963, September 29: 1). The structuralist lan-
guage of the Krewe de Growth universalizes the interest of Big
Easy Elites by masking the benefits to local businessmen as those
of the state and nation.
The discourse also conjoins the interest of the growth coalition
with “national defense.” Tidewater boosters sold the new channel
as a vital investment in national security (ACE 1951). Promoters
drew attention to ostensible strategic benefits of a second outlet to
the sea. The words of the Army Secretary demonstrate the mili-
tary logic:
The recent war demonstrated that harbor facilities, if dispersed
and provided unrestricted access to the sea, are rendered inop-
erative by air or sea action with great difficulty…Hence wide
dispersion of harbor facilities should be provided for in any plan
for comprehensive port development. New Orleans riverside
wharves, of timber construction on long wood piles, cannot be
expected to resist destruction by bombing as practiced in the
recent war, and attack by atom bomb now possible . . . , so
preferably additional installations in the interest of national de-
fense should be located off the river with an unrestricted outlet
to the sea and access to the river through locks which from a
security standpoint, can be considered as alternative entrances.
(ACE 1951: 42)
The proposed canal purportedly secured the nation from nuclear
holocaust. Discursively, the MR-GO became a pro-growth project
that could both promote profit and save lives.
The Krewe de Growth also continued to use of the discourse
of modernization. In the construction of the symbolic landscape,
Big Easy Elites distinguished civilized nature from the “inadequacy”
and “hostility” of its barbarian ancestor, who opposed commerce
and progress. Col. Alexander demonstrates this representational
strategy:
The Port’s life-line should not depend entirely upon a crooked,
fog-covered, silt-bearing, temperamental river channel—a sure,
safe and dependable 40-foot tidewater channel from New
Orleans to the sea should be provided…New Orleans’ port growth
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should not be restrained or restricted like a Chinese girl’s foot.
(New Orleans Item 1943 July 27: 21).
This discourse of port modernization promised a safer, shorter and
more economical route to the sea—that is, a human-engineered
waterway freed from the river’s natural obstacles to commerce:
fogs, sharp turns, shoaling and strong currents. As with the Indus-
trial Canal, human intervention intended to rationalize and adminis-
ter nature “to create the most favorable environment for enter-
prise” (Official Daily Court Record 1943, September 9).
For the local communities, MR-GO supporters made fantastic
promises of an “industrial revolution” and “new vistas” along the
canal (Times Picayune 1957 December 11: 3). The forecast of
new growth assured the Army Corps of Engineers, which certified
the symbolic channel as a “feasible project” (1951).21 The Con-
gress defines feasibility to mean that “the benefits, to whomsoever
they may accrue, are in excess of the estimate cost” (quoted in
Eckstein 1961: 2). But these promises never materialized in St.
Bernard and the Lower Ninth Ward. And as with the Industrial
Canal, immediate social costs arrived long before Katrina. In the
competitive quest for profit, the Krewe de Growth once again dis-
placed residents and restructured the patterns of daily life. Ideo-
logical discourses of the growth coalition not only downplayed their
own interests; they also hid the social costs by abstracting the local
residents from the landscape. Repeated references to the “marsh-
lands” or “lowlands” obscured the social life (e.g. fishing, hunting,
residence, work and play) embedded within the land. Any
acknowledgement of residents was conspicuously absent until con-
struction began (Times Picayune 1957, December 11). One paper
described the area east of the Industrial Canal as “some 34,000
acres of unused low lands” (Official Daily Court Record 1945,
March 20). The Louisiana Legislature declared this landscape to
be “practically valueless” (Louisiana Legislature 1944). However,
people did live and work in the area, and some were directly dis-
placed at Shell Beach, the trapper community in St. Bernard. But
people-less lands are more easily commodified, quantified, and
expropriated (Cronon 1983; Willhems Braun 1998).
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The Built Environment and Citizen Outrage
Following the construction of the MR-GO, the Dock Board
pursued two more major projects that would have, once again,
remade the built environment in the Lower Ninth Ward and St.
Bernard. The first was the Lock Replacement Project. This project
aimed to construct a new lock linking the Mississippi River and the
Industrial Canal in order to allow larger ships to enter the inner
harbor. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1956 already authorized
the new lock when deemed “economically justifiable” (Luria and
Soll 1996). The second project of the Dock Board, which was
contingent upon a new lock, was called Centroport 2000. Centroport
was a plan to completely reorganize the built environment of the
port, moving most facilities off the Mississippi to the Industrial Canal
and the MR-GO (Bechtel 1970). However, the Dock Board en-
countered intense citizen resistance against these plans. Local op-
position successfully defeated the latter and delayed the former
for decades. By the 1990s, the citizen struggle against the Port
Krewe de Growth matured into a movement to close the MR-GO.
In a sense, the Dock Board proposals responded to a changing
economic climate brought by deindustrialization. Two aspects of
this process which affected the port included containerization and
the rise of tourism. In shipping, the “container revolution” trans-
formed the movement of cargo (Kenyan 1971). Containers drasti-
cally increased the need for fixed capital (e.g. gantry cranes) and
land for marshaling yards (Gulf South Research Institute 1968;
Kenyon 1970). While containerization magnified world trade, port
cities derived few benefits from the revolution of the means of
transportation. Its high capital intensity exacerbated inter-port com-
petition, downsized the workforce, and catapulted the shipping
industry’s demand for public subsidization (Helling and Poister 2000).
New Orleans stevedores and shipping interests located on the
riverfront were not in a good position to adopt the new technology
(Bechtel 1970; GSRI 1968). Limited space and inadequate rail and
truck infrastructure along the river convinced the Dock Board that
the Industrial Canal and MR-GO offered the best location for con-
tainer terminals.
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In the post-industrial economy of New Orleans, tourism arose
as a leading sector. Tourism promoters began challenging the privi-
leged status of the Dock Board and its monopoly over riverfront
property. With the help of elected politicians, business elites new to
the city—and therefore not of the old social aristocracy—funneled
public investment into tourism developments, such as the Louisi-
ana Superdome; and, major hotel corporations followed their lead
by erecting high-rises outside the French Quarter (Smith and Keller
1984: 134-137). The surge of public and corporate investment in
New Orleans tourism sparked interests in the Dock Board’s
riverfront property in and near the French Quarter. Plans to con-
vert the riverfront for non-industrial uses appeared in the late 1970s
(Young and Whelan 1993). By the mid 1980s competing agendas
for riverfront property assumed a more hostile quality. Another
growth coalition and non-elected board, the Audubon Commission,
successfully pressured the Dock Board to sell more property for
tourist development (Young and Whelan 1993). In this context of
competing growth coalitions and new methods of cargo handling,
the Krewe de Growth initiated its new campaigns (Bechtel 1970).
In their effort to mobilize public support for additional alterna-
tions to the St. Bernard and the Lower Ninth Ward built environ-
ment, the Big Easy Elites redeployed the discourses of moderniza-
tion and entrepreneurial structuralism. The Dock Board initiated a
public relations campaign to, in the words of its president, “take our
story to as many people as possible” and “educate” the general
public (Atkinson 1969: 2). President Robert R. Barkerding explained
the ideological “story”:
Our people – and I mean every man, woman and child in the city
– should be more port conscious and arise to the need of edu-
cating our present and future citizens to just how much our
city’s progress is dependent on the greatest possible develop-
ment of the port’s potential. (Atkinson 1969: 1)
Implying that economic growth automatically benefits everyone,
the modernization discourse tied the well being of every resident to
new development in the port. It also singled out the industrial canal
lock as a barrier to “our city’s progress.” On this theme, co-direc-
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tor of the port and former colonel from the Corps, Col. W. H.
Lewis, lambasted the “completely inadequate” lock as a “shipping
albatross” (5). The discourse of entrepreneurial structuralism dis-
cussed the port in terms of a “prosper or perish” binary. The im-
perative of containerization was its great concern. But paradoxi-
cally, the Dock Board president framed this need in terms of jobs:
[L]et’s just say if we don’t have these new container terminals in
two or three years, then the character of the Port of New Orleans
will change. It will become a pushbutton port, dealing in com-
modities that don’t require a lot of people to work. (quoted in
Atkinson 1969: 2)
The returning Tidewater Development Association took the lead in
disseminating propaganda by mailing brochures to St. Bernard resi-
dents, which prophesized 10,000 new jobs with the Centroport
(Mazmanian and Nienaber 1979). Considering the capital inten-
sive nature of container terminals, such grand proclamations clearly
overstated the benefits of this growth project.
However, Big Easy Elites encountered new obstacles. In the
Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard, residents challenged the Dock
Board. The Dock Board’s previous success in socializing the costs
and privatizing the benefits fueled local resentment. The first signs
of opposition appeared in 1960 at a meeting between the Dock
Board and St. Bernard residents. The Dock Board called the meet-
ing to notify residents of the new lock, but intense opposition cut
the meeting short. A local lawyer explained the problem:
The Dock Board, as you can remember, some few [years ago]
held a hearing as to what they were going to do for the parish on
the MR-GO…And what happened? The meeting was quickly
discontinued because there was too much opposition for that
Gulf channel, and then they came back and threw it down our
throats and told us that they had deadlines to meet and if we
didn’t agree to give them the ground they were going to court to
take it away from us—that’s what they did—that was what
they intend to do here (quoted in Mazmanian and Nienaber
1979: 85)
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Excluding residents from the decision-making process affecting
their own built environment created new difficulties for subsequent
projects. Indifference by the elites running the non-elected board
engendered local antagonism toward its unaccountable power.
Environmental contradictions to economic growth on the local
and national level also hindered the realization of the Centroport
program. In 1965, an unforeseen event further eroded the credibil-
ity of the Krewe de Growth. Betsy, a category 3 hurricane,
directly hit New Orleans. Forty years before Katrina, this storm
“pushed a wall of water up the Industrial Canal, flooding the Ninth
Ward and St. Bernard Parish” (McQuaid and Schleifstien 2002:
A7). Despite Dock Board and Corps denials, many residents at-
tributed flooding to the MR-GO (Shallot 2000). At the national level,
another problem for the Dock Board came with the passage of the
National Environmental Protection Act in 1969. NEPA empow-
ered citizens with some procedural rights which gave residents the
means to obstruct growth projects (Logan and Molotch 1987). Liti-
gation provided an invaluable tool for residents to contest the power
of the Krewe de Growth.
Encountering these contradictory effects to its previous ac-
complishments, the Dock Board abandoned the Centroport plan in
the 1980s. Nonetheless, Big Easy Elites committed to a lock re-
placement project that would triple the size of the existing lock in
the Ninth Ward. A twenty-five year confrontation between the
Krewe de Growth and neighborhood groups ensued (Luria and
Soll 1996). The Corps attempted to placate residents through “work-
ing groups” and a “mitigation plan” (Luria and Soll 1996). Many
community groups, including the Holy Cross Neighborhood Asso-
ciation, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN) and All Congregations Together, sustained vigi-
lant opposition to the “modernization program” (Warner 2000). A
letter to the editor by John Koeferl, president of the Holy Cross
Neighborhood Association, expressed their position in historical
context:
This neighborhood was here 100 years before the canal. People
yet living bear witness that poor families were thrown in the
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street and their houses torn down to make way for this
canal…The [new lock] project is on a collision course with this
community and threatens its basic values, security and health”
(Koeferl 1999: B6).
Nonetheless, Congress appropriated funds in 1998 (George 2003).
Then, national groups joined the opposition, including U.S. Public
Interest Research Group, Friends of the Earth, and Taxpayers for
Commonsense; and lawsuits delayed the half billion dollar project
(Times Picayune 2001). Another letter to the editor by Octavia
Turner of ACORN articulated resident concerns:
This project is outdated and unnecessary, and it will needlessly
disrupt our quality of life for the next 12 years, causing terrible
problems with construction noise, damaged houses, business
closings, bridge closings, unsafe conditions for school
children…(Turner 2000: B4).
Business groups in the port growth coalition defended the lock
project with the modernization discourse. A spokesman from Ameri-
can Waterways Operators, a barge and towboat trade association,
reiterated the standard argument:
[The lock had] been operating inefficiently because of its age. A
new lock changes everything…A reliable, modern lock spurs
growth throughout the Gulf South” (quoted in Warner 2000,
April 21: A1).
For residents, a wider lock and extended construction period only
promised greater marginalization from the rest of the city (Turni
2001). For the Krewe de Growth, a new lock offered an opportu-
nity for more intense development along the Industrial Canal. “The
value of that property is going to be much greater,” Ron Brison,
director of the port, explained (Darce 1999: C1). This feud be-
tween local residents and the Krewe de Growth continued until the
eve of Katrina (Schleifstien 2005).
After residents managed to fend off the Centroport, an organized
initiative to close the MR-GO slowly crystallized in St. Bernard
Parish. In the late 1980s, local groups, such as the St. Bernard
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Sportsmen League, allied with state environmental organizations
(Ledoux 1993). At the state level, a broad environmental move-
ment to restore Louisiana coastal wetlands garnered wide support
for coastal protection and restoration. This grassroots initiative drew
attention to the environmental cost of the MR-GO. Some attrib-
uted over 40,000 acres of wetland loss to this “marsh-eating mon-
ster,” and noted how the canal itself swelled from an original width
of 500 feet to 2,500 feet in some places (Caffey and Leblanc 2002).
As the broader restoration movement gained steam, it morphed
into a state and federal campaign to acquire $14 billion in federal
funds to “save the coast” (see Coast 2050 www.lacaost.gov/).
Ironically, the Army Corps of Engineers became a leading cheer-
leader for restoration and the mega-projects it would entail. The
role of the “new Corps” as environmental advocate left it vulner-
able to obvious charges of hypocrisy for its commitment to the
MR-GO. Public meetings designed to drum up support for restora-
tion turned into forums where residents contested the canal, crying
that “the MR-GO has to Go!” (Boyd 2004). Aside from the envi-
ronmental costs, the economic rationale for the canal floundered
when ship traffic dwindled to a trickle (Multi-Quest International,
Inc. 2004). Storm-induced silt-ins frequently left the canal unus-
able (Slawsky 2004), which led the president of a shipping com-
pany to admit in 1998 that “the last two years have been disastrous
for the MR-GO” (Duffy 1998).
While a series of severe storms in the late 1990s slowed busi-
ness, it accelerated the effort to close the canal. Critics focused on
the flood danger of the built environment. Pete Savoye from the
St. Bernard Sportsmen League explained the urgency: “I was an
environmentalist. Now, I am more concerned with more important
things—our lives and homes” (2004). In 2002, two retired engi-
neers from St. Bernard, Ed Doody and John Laguens, formed the
Coalition to Close the MR-GO Now. The Coalition partnered with
the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association in the Lower Ninth Ward
and energized public skepticism toward the MR-GO (see
www.ccmrgo.org/). A 2004 survey documented the organizational
success of the community. Over two-thirds of respondents in St.
Bernard agreed the MR-GO increased the likelihood of flooding,
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and only 23% of respondents believed the MR-GO should remain
open to all traffic (Blakely and Bazile 2004).
In the face of declining traffic on the MR-GO, higher mainte-
nance costs and surging public outcry, the Krewe de Growth showed
a willingness to close the MR-GO—but not until the half billion
dollar lock project could be completed in 2017 (Bazile 2004). Port
officials deployed the discourse of entrepreneurial structuralism in
their defense by insisting that they could not “isolate a handful of
businesses” that still relied on the waterway (Schleifstein 2004:
10) and asserting their “responsibility to maintain our economy and
deep-draft traffic” (Bazile 2004: 1). To the opposition, the lock
project did not represent an acceptable alternative, for the flood
danger had become too great (Doody and Laguens 2004). A col-
umnist for the New Orleans Times Picayune captured the sever-
ity of the dilemma: “Let us hope a hurricane does not produce a
surge along the Mr. Go before we have figured out how to close it
down” (Gill 2004: Metro, 7). A St. Bernard Councilman showed
equal foresight: “If we have to wait until the lock is built, we may
not be here” (Balize 2004: 1). Unfortunately, Katrina confirmed
the worst local fears and prophesies of community destruction.
Conclusion
This socio-historical study examined the inter-relationships be-
tween the built environment and social inequality. Contrary to the
claims of some previous scholars (e.g. Miron 1992), this work con-
clusively demonstrates that the New Orleans “social aristocracy”
actively engaged in local growth politics throughout the 20th cen-
tury. It reveals how Big Easy Elites shaped the urban landscape in
their own interests through their control of the Dock Board. The
Krewe de Growth exhibited the power to convert its ideological
claims contained in the discourse of modernization and entrepre-
neurial structuralism into concrete alterations to the New Orleans
landscape. In the cases of the Industrial Canal and Mississippi
River-Gulf Outlet, it expropriated land for new infrastructure and
obtained public funding to completely revamp the built environ-
ment of St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward.
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While much of the post-Katrina analysis in the popular media
rightly looks at race and poverty, this research uncovered another
element of the city’s social inequality in its government structure.
It reveals the historical link between the unaccountable power of a
non-elected board and the transportation infrastructure that de-
stroyed two communities in the New Orleans area. The social
costs and economic benefits of the built environment were un-
evenly distributed before the most recent hurricane. Residents in
the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard experienced immediate
disruptions to their lives; and construction in the 1920s and 1960s
displaced selected families. Hurricane Katrina exacerbated what
had always been an uneven arrangement when it displaced more
than 80,000 people who lived in these communities.
If anything, Hurricane Katrina made visible a more general
contradiction of capitalist urban development when it runs unchecked
by democratic institutions. The Dock Board was created so busi-
ness elites could regulate these tendencies without substantive public
interference. The community protests reviewed in the final section
constituted a social contradiction to the unaccountable power of
this non-elected board. Neighborhood groups and civic organiza-
tions asserted their right to have a voice in the decision-making
that formed the built environment in which they lived and worked.
They confronted the longstanding inequality in New Orleans: the
established privilege of the social aristocracy, who shaped their
neighborhoods while living elsewhere in the city. Frequently in con-
flicts between businesses and neighborhood groups, the concerns
of residents are dismissed as “not in my backyard” ideology, or
“NIMBYISM.” However, promises of “jobs and progress” and
ultimatums of “prosper or perish” broadcasted by growth coali-
tions receive equal scrutiny all too rarely.
To close, I want to make clear that I do not interpret Hurricane
Katrina and the experience of New Orleans as evidence that all
economic growth is unsustainable and inexorably approaches en-
vironmental catastrophe. However, the tragedy and its historical
precursors do confirm the need for meaningful democratic over-
sight of the unaccountable growth coalitions active in every Ameri-
can community.
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Notes
1 The Army Corps of Engineers had long insisted the levees could
withstand a category 3 hurricane. While Katrina made landfall as a strong
category 4 to the west of the city, New Orleans only experienced a category
2 storm.
2 I use the term “built environment” to refer to the socially produced
urban space that encompasses the totality of a city’s physical structure,
including housing, industry, retail, cultural institutions and transportation
and social infrastructure (Harvey 1976).
3 State and County Quickfacts U.S. Census Bureau: http://
quickfacts.census.gov/gdf/states/22/22087.html).
4 Missouri State Census Data Center, Population Trends Report, 1960-
1995: http://leap.ulm.edy/POPHS/190years.txt.
5 State and County Quickfacts U.S. Census Bureau: http://
quickfacts.census.gov/gdf/states/22/22087.html.
6 State and County Quickfacts U.S. Census Bureau: http://
quickfacts.census.gov/gdf/states/22/22087.html).
7 Greater New Orleans Data Center: http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/
8/22/snapshot.html. However, a greater proportion of residents moved to
Jefferson Parish or St. Tammany Parish. These parishes are also more
prosperous than both Orleans and St. Bernard.
8 Center For Business and Economic Research, University of
Louisiana at Monroe.
9 Considering the widespread agreement regarding the influence of
local elites, it is surprising that this group in general and non-elected
boards remain under studied in the urban literature on New Orleans (for
exceptions, see Coltan 2005 and Kellman 2003). Some scholars examining
the post-war decline of the city postulate an elite disengagement with
local politics following the 1960s. For example, Glassman (1978) suggests
that the isolationist culture of New Orleans’ elite, centered on Mardi Gras
and the exclusive “krewes” which organize parades and balls, turned
corporate investment away from the city and left a perpetual leadership
vacuum. Miron (1992) claims that their distrust of government involvement
in the economy and preservationist values stymied development.
Mumprey and Moomau (1984) also argue that “a southern bias against
government interference in private concerns” discouraged city leaders
from pursuing critical federal funds such as offered by Urban Renewal
(91). The argument here, on the other hand, suggests that elites were not
too withdrawn but wield unaccountable power, which allowed for the
poor land use decisions.
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10 In capitalism, production occurs for profit, and capitalists must
recycle a portion of their profits (i.e. capital) back into production. The
recycling constitutes the accumulation process, which is a structural
necessity of the economic system. Accumulation also gives rise to a
number of contradictory tendencies that threaten profitability and growth,
such as working class resistance, over accumulation of capital, or the
destruction of the environment (O’Connor 1994).
11 Roweis and Scott (1981: 127-130) identify three forms of state
intervention in urban land use and the production of space. First, it utilizes
fiscal mechanisms such as property taxes and rent control, as well as
subsidies and tax abatements. Second, the state regulates land use through
zoning, planning and other restrictive devices. Finally, the state directly
invests in the built environment through infrastructural projects and other
forms of social spending (e.g. public housing).
12 For an historical analysis of non-elected boards see Teastrom’s
The Unheralded Triumph. For theoretical discussion on their anti-
democratic implications see Turner’s Liberal Democracy 3.0.
13 Port business encompasses a variety of economic actors. A sample
of the enterprises includes steamship and barge companies, customs
brokers, freight forwarders, stevedores, railroad lines, ship yards, truck
lines, and industrial manufacturing. Numerous financial institutions
directly invest in this industry, and myriad commodity producers rely on
its services (e.g. agriculture, coal, petrochemical products, steel, etc.).
14 The New Orleans Clearing House is a consortium of four banks.
Later acts added two new organizations – New Orleans International
House and Jefferson Parish Council – and recognized the name change of
the Association of Commerce to Chamber of Commerce to the New Orleans
Area. Additionally, one board member was required to reside in Jefferson
Parish. Since construction of the MR-GO it changed again. Now the Board
has seven members (one from St. Bernard) with several more nominating
organizations.
15 A socio-economic analysis of Board memberships from 1896 to
1972 by Schill (1974) illustrates the overwhelming representation of New
Orleans business elites. Over 97% of commissioners were executives or
partners of their own business. After 1940, 86.1% were officers or directors
of one or more of the nominating organizations.
16 A second change to social relation involved the federal government
but would only become in subsequent years. The canal opened a door for
federal participation in port operations. Later, the Army Corps of Engineers
leased out the locks and forebay to make a portion of the canal a federally
controlled waterway (Corps of Engineers U.S. Army and Maritime
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Administration of U.S. Department of Commerce 1947). The Army Corps
of Engineers would later join the ranks of the Krewe de Growth. In total,
this action strengthened the Big Easy Elites’ clutch over land use practices.
17 In more recent years, the width of the MR-GO has expanded to
2,500 feet in some areas as a result of erosion, and the draft of many ocean
vessels has outgrown its depth.
18 The iconography in the campaign for the “sea-way” channel printed
in the Dock Board’s Port Record consistently gendered the port
associating the project with strength and male virility.
19 House Document 245 from the 82nd Congress, 1st session consists
of the collection of reports completed by the Army Corps of Engineers
that was transmitted to the House Committee on Public Works with a
favorable recommendation by the Chief of Engineers. One noteworthy
development in this aspect of the process was the reduction of channel
depth made by the Chief Engineer from 40 feet to 36 feet (House Document
245, 1951).
20 I selected the term to make the irony salient that businessmen—the
mythical, pioneer individualists and “men of character”—underplay, if
not outright deny, their own agency in the proposals.
21 The Congress defines feasibility to mean that “the benefits, to
whomsoever they may accrue, are in excess of the estimate cost” (quoted
in Eckstein 1961: 2).
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